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Abstract
The Todaro Paradox states that policies aimed at reducing urban
unemployment are bound to backﬁre: they will raise rather than re-
duce urban unemployment. The aim of this paper is to reexamine this
paradox in the context of eﬃciency wage and search-matching models.
For that, we study a policy that consists in decreasing the urban un-
employment beneﬁt. In an eﬃciency wage model, we ﬁnd that there is
no Todaro paradox while this is not always true in a search-matching
model since a decrease in the urban unemployment beneﬁt can increase
both urban employment and unemployment.
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tion, policy.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D83, J41, J64, O15.
∗IUI, The Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, 102 15 Stockholm,
Sweden. E-mail: yvesz@iui.se1. Introduction
In two seminal papers, Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) have
developed a canonical model of rural-urban migration. The main idea is quite
simple since it says that migration will occurs as long as the urban expected
income (i.e. income times the probability to ﬁnd an urban job) is higher than
the rural one. These papers have been so inﬂuential that they are referred in
the literature to as the Harris-Todaro model. One of the main issues raised in
these papers was that creating urban jobs may increase rather than decrease
urban unemployment because of the induced negative eﬀect on rural migration,
which may outweight the positive eﬀect of creating jobs (Todaro, 1976). This
is referred to as the Todaro paradox.
Researchers have tried to investigate further this seemingly counterintuitive
result. There is a long line of papers, including Zarembka (1970), Blomqvist
(1978), Arellano (1981), Takagi (1981), Nakagome (1989), Brueckner (1990),
Stark et al. (1991), Raimondos (1993), Brueckner and Zenou (1999), Brueck-
ner and Kim (2001). Most of these papers give conditions under which the
Todaro paradox exists. In the recent literature, a new force has been added by
explicitly introducing the land market in a Harris-Todaro model (Nakagome,
1989, Brueckner, 1990, Brueckner and Zenou, 1999, Brueckner and Kim, 2001).
In that case, the urban-land-rent escalation provides an additional force that
limits migration and the Todaro paradox does not in general exist.
In this literature, a Todaro paradox exists if an increase in urban employ-
ment (endogenous variable) leads to an increase in urban employment (en-
dogenous variable). Because it is always delicate to analyze the impact of an
endogenous variable on another, we consider here the eﬀect of a decrease of
urban unemployment beneﬁt on urban unemployment. Indeed, in our model,
we assume that an unemployment beneﬁt is paid to the urban sector. In the
context of a third world country it may interpreted as family or institutional
support in the urban sector. A country like China for example has important
social beneﬁt policies. The state-sponsored social insurance system, which ac-
counts for the bulk of public social spending, is now being gradually improved
and extended to cover all urban workers (see e.g. Knight and Song, 2005).1
In our framework, a Todaro paradox will exist if a reduction in the urban
1All our analysis would be unchanged if we interpret unemployment as the informal sector
(like for example in Brueckner and Zenou, 1999). In that case, the unemployment beneﬁt
would mean the revenue of informal workers and thus an unemployment beneﬁt policy would
take the form of an increase in the revenue of the urban informal sector.
2unemployment beneﬁt (exogenous variable and policy instrument) leads to an
increase of both urban employment and unemployment. This is a paradox
since a reduction in the unemployment beneﬁth a st h en a t u r a le ﬀect to in-
crease urban employment but the counterintuitive eﬀe c tt oa l s oi n c r e a s eu r b a n
unemployment.
In order to analyze this policy, we use two standard models of the labor
market that have both strong empirical supports2 a n dt h a th a v eb e e nu s e di n
the rural-urban migration literature. An eﬃciency wage model (see Stiglitz,
1974, 1976, Moene, 1988, Smith and Zenou, 1995, Brueckner and Zenou, 1999,
Brueckner and Kim, 2001, for its utilization in the context of rural-urban mi-
gration) is ﬁrst developed. We then consider a search-matching model. There
is a tradition of search models in the migration literature. The early mod-
els were using the old search approach where only one side of the market
( t h ew o r k e r s )w a sm o d e l e d( s e ee . g . F i e lds, 1975, 1989, Banerjee, 1984, Mo-
htadi, 1989, etc.). There is also a more recent literature, which incorporates
the search-matching approach a la Pissarides-Mortensen (Mortensen and Pis-
sarides, 1999; Pissarides, 2000) in a Harris-Todaro model (see Coulson et al.,
2001, Ortega, 2000, Sato, 2004, Laing et al., 2005). This is what we are using
here.
In an “autarky” model where only the urban sector is considered and no
rural-urban migration takes place, then in either an eﬃciency wage or a search
matching model, a decrease in the unemployment beneﬁt always reduces urban
unemployment and increases urban employment. When free mobility between
rural and urban areas is allowed, the results are not anymore straightforward.
We ﬁnd that in an eﬃciency wage model a la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984),
there is no Todaro paradox. The intuition is as follows. When the government
decreases the unemployment beneﬁt, this has a direct negative eﬀect on urban
wages and thus more urban jobs are created. This is the attraction force to
t h ec i t y .T h i si m p l i e st h a tr u r a lw a g e si n c r e a s eb u ts i n c et h e r ea r em o r ej o b s
in cities and eﬃciency wages act as a worker’s discipline device, urban ﬁrms
reduce their wages because it becomes more diﬃcult to ﬁnd a job. Because the
2The traditional attempts to test eﬃciency wage theory showed that there are large wage
diﬀerences between sectors for identical workers, due to diﬀerences in supervision/monitoring
rates (Kruger and Summers, 1988; Dickens and Katz, 1987; Murphy and Topel, 1990; Neal,
1993). So identical individuals working in diﬀerent sectors can experience diﬀerent unem-
ploment rates because of inter-industry wage diﬀerences. Concerning the search-matching
model, the empirical supports are also very strong. See in particular Devine and Kiefer
(1991) and Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001).
3repulsion force is strong enough, the net eﬀe c ti st h a tc r e a t i n gu r b a nj o b sv i a
a reduction in unemployment beneﬁt reduces urban unemployment because of
the discouraging eﬀect of eﬃciency wages on migration.
In the case of a search-matching model where wages are bargained, a Todaro
paradox may exist if a condition on parameters is satisﬁed. Indeed, a decrease
in the unemployment beneﬁt has a direct negative eﬀect on bargained wages.
As a result, because it is cheaper and thus more proﬁt a b l et oh i r eaw o r k e r ,
more ﬁr m se n t e rt h eu r b a nl a b o rm a r k e ta n dm o r ej o b sa r ec r e a t e d ,a n dt h u s
rural-urban migration increases. However, when the unemployment beneﬁt
decreases, there is a also direct negative eﬀe c to nm i g r a t i o ns i n c eu r b a nw a g e s
a r el o w e ra n dt h u sl e s sr u r a lw o r k e r sm i g r a t e .T h en e te ﬀect is thus ambiguous.
A condition that guarantees that the indirect positive eﬀect on migration is
larger than the direct negative eﬀect leads to a Todaro paradox since a decrease
in unemployment beneﬁt increases in this case both urban employment and
unemployment.
2. Urban eﬃciency wages
There are two regions: Rural and urban. It is assumed that the rural wage is
ﬂexible enough to guarantee that there is no rural unemployment; this wage is
denoted by wR
L. There is a continuum of ex ante identical workers whose mass
is N.A m o n gt h eN workers, NC and NR live respectively in cities and rural








where Lg and Ug are respectively the total employment and unemployment
levels in region g = C,R (C for cities and R for rural areas). As stated
above, there is no unemployment in rural areas. Thus, by combining these two
equations, we obtain:
U
C = N − L
C − L
R (2.1)




UC + LC =
N − LC − LR
N − LR (2.2)
Both regions produce the same good but use diﬀerent techniques. In region
g, yg units of output are produced and Lg workers are employed. This is a
4short-run model where capital is ﬁxed and the production function in region






g) > 0 and F
00g(L
g) ≤ 0 (2.3)
We also assume that the Inada conditions hold, that is limLg→0Fg0(Lg)=+ ∞
and limLg→+∞Fg0(Lg)=0 . The price of the good is taken as a numeraire and,
without loss of generality, normalized to 1. We use the standard eﬃciency wage
model, as proposed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). Each individual supplies
one unit of labor. As in the standard eﬃciency wage model, there are only two
possible levels of eﬀort: either the worker shirks, exerting zero eﬀort, e =0 ,
and contributing zero to production, or he/she does not shirk, providing full
eﬀort.
The model is dynamic and we assume that, if rural workers want to get
an urban job, they have ﬁr s tt om o v et ot h ec i t y ,b eu n e m p l o y e da n dg a t h e r
information about jobs, and then can eventually obtain an urban job. In the
urban labor market, ﬁrms cannot perfectly monitor workers so that there is
a probability of being detected shirking, denoted by θ. If a worker is caught
shirking, he/she is automatically ﬁred. Time is continuous and workers live
forever. We assume that changes in employment status are governed by a
Poisson process in which a is the (endogenous) job acquisition rate and δ the
(exogenous) destruction rate. Let us denote by r the common discount rate
of all workers. Then, the standard steady-state Bellman equations for the





L − e − δ(I
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L − (δ + m)(I
S
L − IU) (2.5)
rI U = w
C
U + a
C(IL − IU) (2.6)
where wC
L,w C
U are the urban wage and the unemployment beneﬁt respectively,
e is the eﬀort level, r t h ed i s c o u n tr a t e ,δ,m and a denote the job-destruction,
monitoring and job-acquisition rates, respectively. Firms set the eﬃciency
wage such that INS
L = IS
L = IL and we obtain that IL −IU = e/m. This is the
surplus of being employed and it is strictly positive. As in Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984), this a pure incentive eﬀect to deter shirking. This surplus only depends
on the monitoring technology, since more monitoring implies less shirking, and
on the eﬀort level provided by workers.
Equation (2.4) can be written as:
w
C
L = e + rIL + δ(IL − IU)=e + rIU +( δ + r)(IL − IU)






U + e +
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m
(a + δ + r)





N − LC − LR (2.7)












N − LC − LR + r
#
(2.8)
We have the standard eﬀects of the eﬃciency wage (see Shapiro and Stiglitz,
1984). What is new here is the fact that rural employment aﬀects the eﬃciency
wage. Indeed, LR positively aﬀects wC
L because more employment in rural areas
implies a higher urban job acquisition rate aC (indeed higher LR leads to a
decrease in urban unemployment since there are less competition for urban
jobs) and thus urban ﬁrms have to increase their wages to meet the Non-
Shirking Condition (2.8). In cities, ﬁrms decide their employment level by






In rural areas, we assume that jobs are mainly menial and wages are ﬂexible







We assume that the Inada conditions on both production functions hold. Con-
cerning rural-urban migration, as stated above, we assume that a rural worker
cannot search from home but must ﬁrst be unemployed in the city and then












The left-hand side is the intertemporal utility of moving to the city (remember
that a migrant must ﬁrst be unemployed) while the right-hand side corresponds
to the intertemporal utility of staying in rural areas. Using (2.4)−(2.7), INS
L =
IS











where LC is determined by (2.9).
6Deﬁnition 1. A Harris-Todaro equilibrium with eﬃciency wages is a 5-tuple
(wC
L,L C,w R
L,UC,L R) such that (2.8), (2.9), (2.10), (2.1) and (2.12) are satis-
ﬁed.
In this model, given that wC
U,e,m,δ,N,rare exogenous, an equilibrium is
calculated as follows. First, from (2.8), one can calculate the urban eﬃciency
wage as a function of LC and LR,t h a ti swC
L(LC,L R). Second, by plugging
this value wC
L(LC,L R) in (2.9), one obtains a relationship between LC and LR,
that we write LC
w(LR) and is given by
w
C



























where 0 <L C
w(LR) <L C
0 <Nis the unique solution of the following equation
w
C













Third, the equilibrium-migration condition (2.12) gives another relationship
between LC and LR,t h a tw ed e n o t eb yLC




















where 0 <L C
h(LR) <L R
0 <N. Figure 1 describes the two curves (2.13) (labor
demand equation) and (2.12) (migration equilibrium condition) in the plane
(LR,L C) and it is easy to see that there exists a unique equilibrium that gives
a unique value of LC and a unique value of LR that we denote by (LR∗,L C∗).
Finally, plugging LR∗ and LC∗ in (2.8), (2.10) and (2.1) gives respectively
the equilibrium values of wC∗
L ,w R∗
L ,UC∗.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Let us now study the Todaro paradox in this model. Of course, since LC is
an endogenous variable, it is diﬃcult to study the impact of LC on UC or uC.
However, we can study the impact of a reduction of unemployment beneﬁt wC
U
on urban unemployment since wC
U has a direct impact on LC.W e h a v e t h e
following result:
7Deﬁnition 2. In a model where wage wC
L and employment LC are endogenous,
a Todaro paradox prevails if an increase or decrease in a policy variable leads to
an increase in the equilibrium values of both LC and UC (or uC). If one takes
for example the unemployment beneﬁt wC
U, then a Todaro paradox prevails if
by reducing wC
U,b o t hLC and UC (or uC) increase, that is ∂LC/∂wC
U < 0 and
∂UC/∂wC
U < 0 (or ∂uC/∂wC
U < 0). Diﬀerentiating (2.1), this implies that a









Using this deﬁnition, let us now study the Todaro paradox in this model.
As stated above and described by Figure 1, the equilibrium is determined by



















Indeed, a higher unemployment beneﬁt, wC
U,o re ﬀort level, e, or job-destruction
rate, δ, or discount rate, r, or a lower monitoring rate, m, or total population,
N, makes the city more attractive because of higher intertemporal utility of
being unemployed in the city, IU (remember that IL −IU = e/m). Thus more
workers leave the rural area, which reduces LR.W h e nLC increases, the urban
job acquisition rate aC increases and again more rural workers migrate to the
city, thus reducing LR.

























mδ(N − LR) − (N − LC − LR)
2 F00C(LC)
< 0 (2.17)
Indeed, a higher wC
U,o re,o rδ,o rr,o ral o w e rm,o rN, shifts upward the
Non-Shirking Condition (2.8), so ﬁr m sh a v et op a yah i g h e re ﬃciency wage to
prevent shirking. This, in turn, reduces employment since, because of higher
wage costs, maximizing-proﬁt ﬁrms have to reduce the number of employed.
For LR,t h ee ﬀect is through the job-acquisition rate aC. Indeed, a higher
rural employment LR increases aC,w h i c ho b l i g e sﬁrms to increase their urban
eﬃciency wages, which in turn reduces urban labor demand LC because ﬁrms
maximize their proﬁt. We obtain the following result:
8Proposition 1. In an Harris-Todaro model with urban eﬃciency wages, de-
creasing unemployment beneﬁtl e a d st o
(i) an increase in urban employment LC, i.e. ∂LC∗/∂wC
U < 0;
(ii) an increase in rural employment LR,i . e .∂LC∗/∂wC
U < 0;
(iii) a decrease in urban unemployment (both in level and rate) UC and uC,
i.e. ∂UC∗/∂wC
U > 0 and ∂uC∗/∂wC
U > 0.
As a result, there is no Todaro paradox.
The proof of this proposition is tedious and can be found at the end of this
appendix. There is thus no Todaro paradox in this model. The intuition is as
follows. When the government decreases the unemployment beneﬁt, this has
a direct negative eﬀect on urban wages and thus more urban jobs are created.
This is the attraction force to the city. But there are two repulsion forces.
As before, this implies that rural wages increase but since there are more jobs
in cities and eﬃciency wages act as a worker’s discipline device, urban ﬁrms
reduce their wages because it becomes more diﬃcult to ﬁnd a job. Because
the repulsion forces are strong enough, the net eﬀect is that creating urban
j o b sv i aar e d u c t i o ni nu n e m p l o y m e n tb e n e ﬁt reduces urban unemployment
because of the discouraging eﬀect of eﬃciency wages on migration.
These results are quite interesting. Let us see what happens in the autarky
case, i.e. the case of no mobility between rural and urban areas. Indeed,
imagine now that migration was totally controlled and that workers, especially
rural workers could not migrate to cities. In that case, the two regions (C and












UC + LC =
NC − LC
NC
Here, only LC is endogenous and not LR. Thus, the job acquisition rate and














N − LC + r
¸
(2.18)
and the labor demand would still be given by (2.9). The urban labor equilib-
rium would then be deﬁned as:
w
C










Deﬁnition 3. An eﬃciency wage equilibrium with no mobility is a triple
(wC∗
L ,L C∗,w R∗
L ) such that (2.18) (2.9) and (2.10) are satisﬁed.
From this deﬁnition and by totally diﬀerentiating (2.19), we obtain the
following result:
Proposition 2. In eﬃciency wage equilibrium with no mobility, decreasing
the unemployment beneﬁt wU always increases urban employment and de-













This result is not surprising since when wC
U decreases, ﬁrms can reduce
their eﬃciency wages and thus hire more workers. There is no eﬀect on rural
workers. However, even when rural-urban migration is authorized, we obtain
the same results because the repulsion forces are suﬃciently strong to thwart
the attraction force of a reduction of the unemployment beneﬁt.
3. Urban search-matching
We would like to endogeneize both urban wages and urban unemployment
using a standard search matching model as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)




where UC and V C are the total number of urban unemployed and urban va-
cancies, respectively. This matching function captures the frictions that search
behaviors of both ﬁrms and workers imply. It is assumed that d(.) is increas-
ing in its arguments, concave and homogeneous of degree 1. Thus, the rate at
which vacancies are ﬁlled is d(UC,VC)/V C = d(1/θ
C,1) ≡ q(θ





10is a measure of labor market tightness in cities and q(θ
C) is a Poisson intensity.
S i m i l a r l y ,t h er a t ea tw h i c ha nu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e rl e a v e su n e m p l o y m e n t( j o b
















C)(IL − IU) (3.4)
By combining (3.3) and (3.4), we obtain:












L − δ(IF − IV) (3.6)
rIV = −γ + q(θ
C)(IF − IV) (3.7)
where γ i st h es e a r c hc o s tf o rt h eﬁrm and yC is the product of the match.
Because of free entry, IV =0 . From (3.7) and using IV =0 ,t h ev a l u eo faj o b





Firms enter the labor market until the expected beneﬁt IF is equal the expected
cost γ/q(θ) (remember that, in a Poisson process, the inverse of the exist rate
q(θ) expresses the average duration of a vacant job). Finally, plugging (3.8)
into (3.6) and using IV =0 , we obtain the following decreasing relation between









In words, the value of a job is equal to the expected search cost, i.e. the cost
per unit of time multiplied by the average duration of search for the ﬁrm. So,
ﬁrms’ job creation is endogenous and is determined by (3.9).
Let us now determined the wage. At each period, the total intertemporal
surplus is shared through a generalized Nash-bargaining process between the
3For simplicity, it is assumed that each ﬁrm only hires one worker.
11ﬁrm and the worker. The total surplus is the sum of the surplus of the workers,











































= −1/(r + δ),e q u a t i o n( 3 . 1 1 )c a nb ew r i t t e na s :







Then, using (3.5) and (3.9), we ﬁnally obtain the following wage:
w
C








This is the wage-setting curve (a relation between wages and the state of the la-
bor market, here θ
C) that replaces, in search-matching models, the traditional
labor-supply curve.
As before, the unemployment level in cities in equal to:
U
C = N − L
C − L
R (3.14)
In steady-state, ﬂo w si na n do u tu n e m p l o y m e n th a v et ob ee q u a la n dw eo b t a i n




















Finally, we assume that a rural worker cannot search from home but must ﬁrst
be unemployed in the city and then search for a job. Thus the equilibrium


















Deﬁnition 4. A Harris-Todaro equilibrium with urban search externalities
and bargained wages is a 5-tuple (wC
L,θ
C,w R
L,L C,UC,VC,L R)s u c ht h a t( 3 . 1 3 ) ,
(3.9), (3.16), (3.15), (3.14), (3.1) and (3.17) are satisﬁed.
Here is the way the equilibrium is calculated. The system is recursive.
First, by combining (3.13) and (3.9), we obtain a unique θ
C∗ that is only

































C∗ gives a unique LR∗ as a function of parameters only. Further-
more, by plugging θ
C∗ and LR∗ in (3.13), we obtain a unique LC∗.F i g u r e 2
illustrates the way the equilibrium is calculated.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Finally, by plugging LC∗ and LR∗ in (3.16) and (3.14), we obtain respec-
tively wR∗
L and UC∗ and by plugging θ
C∗ in (3.18), we obtain wC∗
L . Also, using
the values of θ
C∗ and UC∗ in (3.1), we obtain the equilibrium number of va-
cancies in cities, V C∗.
Here the migration process is more complex. If the government reduces
the unemployment beneﬁt, this will again have a direct eﬀect by increasing
urban jobs. Indeed, since the wage is reduced (see (3.13)), more ﬁrms enter
the market (see (3.9)) and thus more urban jobs are created. There will still be
a repulsion force because of the positive eﬀect on rural wage. But since workers
face less search frictions (more ﬁrms enter the market) more rural workers will
migrate to the cities, which in turn increases workers’ search frictions. We
have the following result:4
4The proof of Proposition 3 can be found at the end of this appendix.
13Proposition 3. In an Harris-Todaro model with urban search externalities
and bargained wages, decreasing unemployment beneﬁt wC
U leads to:
(i) an increase in both urban job creation θ
C and urban employment LC,
(ii) an ambiguous eﬀe c to nb o t hr u r a le m p l o y m e n tLR and urban unemploy-
ment (both in level and rate) UC and uC.


























then a Todaro paradox prevails, that is decreasing wC
U increases both urban
employment and unemployment.
Ad e c r e a s ei nwC
U has a direct negative eﬀect on bargained wages. As a
result, because it is cheaper and thus more proﬁt a b l et oh i r eaw o r k e r ,m o r e
ﬁrms enter the urban labor market and more jobs are created; consequently
θ
C and LC increase. However, the eﬀect on rural-urban migration and thus on
LR is more subtle. Indeed, when wC
U decreases, there is a direct negative eﬀect
on migration since urban wages are lower and thus less rural workers migrate
(thus LR increases). There is also an indirect positive eﬀect on migration
since a lower wC
U increases wC
L and thus more ﬁrms enter the urban labor
market (if the search cost c is not too large) and more jobs are created. This
increases rural-urban migration and thus reduces LR. The net eﬀect is thus
ambiguous. The same ambiguity arises when one studies the eﬀect of wC
U on
urban unemployment. These results mean that there is a possibility for a
Todaro paradox, that is a decrease in unemployment beneﬁt can increase both
urban employment and unemployment. This is true if at least the indirect
positive eﬀect on migration is larger than direct negative eﬀect mentioned
above.
As in the eﬃciency wage model, let us study the case with no mobility
between the two regions. The wage wC
L a n dt h ej o bc r e a t i o nr a t eθ
C are still















such that (3.13), (3.18), (3.20) and (2.10) are satisﬁed.
14By totally diﬀerentiating (3.18), (3.20) and (3.14), we have the following
result:
Proposition 4. In a search equilibrium with no mobility, decreasing the un-
employment beneﬁt wC
U increases both urban job creation θ
C and urban em-



















Again this is very intuitive. If the unemployment beneﬁt decreases, wages
are reduced (see (3.13)) because workers have lower outside option. As a
result, ﬁrms’ expected proﬁt increases and thus more jobs are created, which
increases θ
C.T h i s r a i s e s u r b a n e m p l o y m e n t LC (see (3.20)) and decreases
both the level and the rate of urban unemployment since UC = N − LC and




In this paper, we have reexamined the Todaro paradox in the context of both
eﬃciency wage and search-matching models. The deﬁn i t i o naT o d a r op a r a -
dox adopted here is a little bit diﬀerent than that of the standard literature.
Indeed, in the present paper where both wages and employment in cities are
endogenous, a Todaro paradox exists if an increase or decrease in an exogenous
policy variable leads to an increase in the equilibrium values of both urban em-
ployment and unemployment. In the present paper, we have chosen to focus
on urban unemployment beneﬁt ,w h i c hi nt h ec o n t e x to fat h i r dw o r l dc o u n t r y
could be interpreted as family or institutional support in the urban sector. In
the eﬃciency wage model, we ﬁnd that there is no Todaro paradox while this
is not always true in a search-matching model since a decrease in the urban
unemployment beneﬁt can increase both urban employment and unemploy-
ment. Indeed, even though in both models an unemployment beneﬁtp o l i c y
has a direct impact on the decision to migrate since it directly aﬀects IU,t h e
lifetime expected utility of moving to the city, the eﬀects on the urban labor
market are diﬀerent. This is because in a search matching model it is time
c o n s u m i n gt oo b t a i naj o ba n dt oﬁll a vacancy in the urban area and the
creation of jobs is endogenous. As a result, a policy that reduces the urban
unemployment beneﬁth a sad i r e c ti m p a c to nt h er a t ea tw h i c hp e o p l ea n d
ﬁrms live their state of non-activity. In an eﬃciency wage model where there
15is no search frictions and no endogenous job creation, the same policy has only
an indirect eﬀect on the exit rate of the unemployed and the vacant ﬁrms via
the eﬃciency wage.
We believe that this paper gives some answers to important questions about
migration in developing countries. Indeed, any policy implemented in cities
should take into account the induced eﬀect on mobility and migration from
rural areas or cities of smaller size (even if it is illegal). It would also be
interesting to consider other urban policies such as subsidizing urban wages
or facilitating the entry of urban ﬁrms in the labor market. We leave these
projects for future research.
5 .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n s
5.1. Proof of Proposition 1
The Harris-Todaro equilibrium is deﬁned by equations (2.13) and (2.12). From




, whose properties are given by (2.16). Plug-







N − LC(LR∗,h U) − LR∗ =
F0R(LR∗)
r
that gives a unique LR, which is a function of exogenous parameters only, and
in particular a function of wC
U. This is why we denote the equilibrium value
that we obtain by LR∗ ≡ LR(wC
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∂LR∗ < 0,s ow ec a n n o t
sign this derivative.
Now, plugging this value LR∗ ≡ LR(wC
U) in (2.13), we obtain a unique
LC∗ ≡ LC(wC
















where LC∗ ≡ LC(LR∗,w C



















is given by (5.1).
Let us now calculate the exact value of ∂LR∗
∂wC
U
. By plugging (2.17) and (5.2)
in (5.1) and solving in ∂LR∗
∂wC
U







































We can now calculate ∂LC∗
∂wC
U

























































Let us show that ∂LC∗
∂wC
U
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Let us now calculate ∂UC∗
∂wC
U































Finally, using Deﬁnition 2 and in particular (2.14), it is easy to verify that
there is no Todaro paradox.
5.2. Proof of Proposition 3












¤2 < 0 (5.4)













































As u ﬃcient condition for ∂LR
∂θC < 0 is γ>w R































































































which using (5.6), (5.7) and (5.5) is equivalent to





































































































which is the condition displayed in the proposition.
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24Figure 2: Harris-Todaro equilibrium with search externalities
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